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ESSAY
Department of Defense Procurement
Practices After Adarand: What Lies
Ahead for the Largest Purchaser of
Goods and Services and Its Base
of Small Disadvantaged Business
Contractors
DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES*
AND CHRISTOPHER LEON JONES, JR.**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Three decades have passed since the inception of experimental
special programs collectively known as affirmative action.1 The term
embraces an array of initiatives, including special recruiting and hiring
goals, designed to help racial minorities and women become full participants in this nation's economic structure.
In 1961, federal affirmative action programs were initiated by
President John F. Kennedy.' With regard to public procurement con* Danielle Conway-Jones (B.S., New York University, 1989; J.D., Howard University
School of Law, 1992; LL.M. Candidate, Environmental Law and Government Contracts, George
Washington University Law School) is a Judge Advocate assigned to the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Chief Counsel's Honors Program in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
United States Army, Department of Defense, or the United States government.
** Christopher Leon Jones, Jr. (B.B.A., University of Michigan, 1989; J.D., Howard University School of Law, 1992) is an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate and Chief of Adverse Actions
assigned to Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United
States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States government.
1. Holly Idelson, A Thirty Year Experiment, 53 CONG. Q. 1579 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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tracting, President Kennedy ordered federal contractors to make special efforts to ensure that workers be hired and treated without regard
to race or ethnicity.4 President Lyndon B. Johnson significantly expanded affirmative action programs by requiring contractors who conducted business with the federal government to adopt affirmative
action plans for all their operations, including goals and timetables for
5
increased minority hires.
The most important advancement, however, was made by President Nixon in 1969 when he implemented the "Philadelphia Plan,"
which required minimum levels of minority participation on federal
construction projects in Philadelphia and three other cities. 6 These
efforts culminated in virtually all federal contractors adopting affirmative action plans during the following year. 7 The agency initially
charged with the responsibility for implementing and enforcing the
affirmative action plans mandated by the Executive Branch was the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP").
Because of the efforts of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, federal agencies such as the Department of Defense
("DoD") began to seriously establish affirmative action plans in the
context of government procurement. DoD's establishment of these
programs was critical because federal government construction is believed to represent almost five percent of all new construction, with
military construction having a substantial impact on the entire construction industry.9 In addition, DoD executes roughly two-thirds of
all federal prime contracts, spending approximately $175 billion a year
on goods and services. 10 Of these contract dollars spent by DoD,
small disadvantaged businesses ("SDBs") received $13 billion in fed4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. id.
8. White House Office of Communications, Affirmative Action Review: Report to the
President, at 29 (July 19, 1995) (available through White House Office of Communications,
Washington, D.C., or through White House home page on the Internet Worldwide Web at http:/
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/aa-index.html). On March 7, 1995, President William J. Clinton directed that a review be conducted of the federal government's affirmative action programs describing and explaining the design and effects of the programs and initiatives in
place. Id. at 1.
9. G. BROCKWEL HEYLIN, TnE COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROcEss-AN ENDANGERED SPEciaEs? 7 (1981).

10. Sharon 0. Richardson, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 6 (Nov. 1, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for Judge Advocate General's Fiscal Law Course, citing DoD
News Release on the President's FY 1996 Budget) (on file with author).
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eral contract dollars with only one-sixth of that amount spent on subcontracting with other non-minority small and large businesses. 1
Despite close to 95% of prime contract dollars being awarded to
non-minority businesses, majority contractors believe that affirmative
action in the form of federal procurement minority set-asides is "discrimination for its own sake."' 2 Seemingly adopting this belief, the
Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,'3 struck a blow
to the minority contracting community by raising the standard of review in cases challenging the constitutionality of federal affirmative
14
action programs to the highest level of review-strict scrutiny.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand, DoD has
been compelled to quickly review its own affirmative action programs
and determine the best course of action in light of the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that federal race-conscious affirmative action
programs be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Part II of this essay begins with a brief analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand
and the legislative history of DoD's most successful affirmative action
procurement program, which is often referred to as the "1207 program."'" Part III reviews the post-Adarand effect on the program,
highlighting legal challenges to DoD's race-based set-asides. Part IV
proposes the type of evidence that may be used by DoD to support
the constitutionality of its affirmative action programs and suggests
alternative programs which will ensure that small disadvantaged businesses receive meaningful opportunities to compete for defense contract dollars.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF ADARAND

Adarand Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand") is a "Colorado based
highway construction company specializing in guardrail work."' 6 In
1989, the Mountain Gravel and Construction Company ("Mountain
Gravel") was awarded the prime contract for a highway construction
11. White House Office of Communications, supra note 8, at 66.
12.

MICHAEL A. CARVIN ET AL., RACIAL PREFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACrING

111 (Robert Clegg ed., 1993) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,307 (1978)).
13. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
14. Id. at 2118.
15. In 1987, Congress passed that year's Defense Authorization Act, which included § 1207,
entitled "Contract Goal for Minorities," later codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2323 and renamed "Contract Goal for Small Disadvantaged Businesses and Certain Institutions of Higher Education."
10 U.S.C. § 2323 (1988).
16. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
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project in Colorado by the Central Federal Lands Highway Division
("CFLHD") of the United States Department of Transportation
("DoT").' 7 Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors for
the guardrail portion of the project, and Adarand submitted the lowest bid. 18 Gonzales Construction Company ("Gonzales") also submitted a bid in response to Mountain Gravel's solicitation.' 9 Although
Adarand had submitted the lowest bid in response to Mountain
Gravel's solicitation, Adarand was not certified as a small business
controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."2
The prime contract's terms gave additional compensation to Mountain
Gravel for hiring subcontractors certified as SDBs, and Gonzales, who
was a certified SDB, was awarded the subcontract from Mountain
Gravel. 2 '
Adarand's claim before the Supreme Court did not center on
Mountain Gravel's award of the subcontract to Gonzales; rather, it
revolved around the presumption created by a section of the Small
Business Act in favor of minorities. 22 The Small Business Act mandates the inclusion of a clause which gives general contractors in gov23
ernment projects additional financial compensation for hiring SDBs.
Furthermore, the Small Business Act states that "contractor[s] shall
presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual
found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business]24Administration
pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act."
DoT established a subcontracting compensation clause ("SCC")
program to implement the Small Business Act. Under the SCC program, prime contractors whose number of SDB subcontracts exceeded
certain percentages received incentive payments. 2 An SCC clause
was included in the contract awarded to Mountain Gravel.2" Adarand
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)(ii) (1988).

23. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(2) (1988).

24. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)(ii) (1988).
25. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103.
26. The clause in the contract awarded to Mountain Gravel reads as follows:
Subcontracting. This subsection is supplemented to include a Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise (DBE) Development and Subcontracting Provision as follows:
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asserted that the presumption of social and economic disadvantage
created by the statute and the federal government's use of race-con-

scious presumptions in identifying individuals, discriminates on the
basis of race27 in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection.

Adarand's claim was rejected by the Tenth Circuit when the court

applied the "heightened scrutiny" standard.2" The court found that
the CFLHD had acted within its discretion by adhering to the congressional mandate expressed in the Small Business Act.29 In vacating
the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local gov-

ernmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. ' 30 Without invalidating the specific classification in the
Small Business Act, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Circuit
used the incorrect standard in evaluating Adarand's challenge. 31 The
Court remanded the case to determine whether DoT's SCC program
tailored" to achieve a "compelling" government
is "narrowly
32
interest.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize that
there was a continued need for the classifications found in the Small
Business Act.3 3 The Court even stated that a racial classification
might withstand constitutional muster where it is found to be narrowly
Monetary compensation is offered for awarding subcontracts to small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.... A small business concern will be considered a DBE after it has been certified as
such by the U.S. Small Business Administration or any State Highway Agency. Certification by other Government agencies, counties, or cities may be acceptable on an individual basis provided the Contracting Officer has determined the certifying agency has
an acceptable and viable DBE certification program. If the Contractor requests payment under this provision, the Contractor shal furnish the engineer with acceptable
evidence of the subcontractor(s) DBE certification and shall furnish one certified copy
of the executed subcontract(s).
The Contractor will be paid an amount computed as follows:
1.If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10 percent of the final amount of the
approved DBE subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of the original contract amount.
2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more DBEs, 10 percent of the final
amount of the approved DBE subcontracts, not to exceed 2 percent of the original
contract amount.
Id. at 2103-04.
27. Id. at 2102.
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1994).
29. Id. at 1545-46.
30. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097. 2113 (1995).
31. Id. at 2118.
32. Id.
33. "The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and the government is
not disqualified from acting in response to it." Id. at 2117.
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tailored to further a compelling interest on the part of the government.'
Nevertheless, the ruling in Adarand has had the effect of
foreclosing any opportunity to draw racial classifications that could
comply with the Constitution. By requiring courts to review all racial
classifications under the strict scrutiny standard, the Court has set the
stage for the end of governmental racial classificationsa
Notably, only two of the Justices in the majority favored a blanket prohibition on racial classifications. Justice Scalia remarked that
"government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating
on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination
in the opposite direction."6 Likewise, Justice Thomas, in accord with
Justice Scalia, stated "that under our Constitution, the government
may not make distinctions on the basis of race. ' 37 Justices Scalia and
Thomas, however, fail to address the differences in the people of our
country, which in many circumstances, are magnified by disparate
treatment based on race and economic status.
The difficulty lies in the majority's use of a single standard applied to all race-based programs that fails to take into account the
Court's jurisprudence regarding the difference between "invidious"
and "benign" discrimination.3" The dissenters in Adarand point not
only to the differences among the American people themselves, but
also to the differences among the institutions that govern the American people. Specifically, Justice Stevens found fault with the majority's analysis because it did not recognize that the federal and the state
governments have inherently different powers. 39 Justice Stevens ob34. "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow-tailoring' test this Court has set out in
previous cases." id.
35. As Justice Stevens observed:
I think that it is unfortunate that the majority insists on applying the label 'strict scrutiny' to benign race-based programs. That label has usually been understood to spell
the death of any governmental action to which a court may apply it. The Court suggests today that 'strict scrutiny' means something different-something less strictwhen applied to benign racial classifications. Although I agree that benign programs
deserve different treatment than invidious programs, there is a danger that the fatal
language of 'strict scrutiny' will skew the analysis and place well-crafted benign programs at unnecessary risk.
Id. at 2121 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
37. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
38. Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
39. Id. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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served that "an interest in 'consistency' does not justify treating differences as though they were similarities."4
The use of a single standard to evaluate all race-conscious programs also fails to consider the fundamental concept of "congruence."41 To equate the review of a federally created affirmative action
program with that of a state-created affirmative action program fails
to recognize the difference between federal and state governments. In
essence, the majority does not afford Congress the appropriate level
of deference. As recognized in Fullilove v. Klutznick,4 2 the Court
deference" to
must approach its task of review with "appropriate
43
Congress as a co-equal branch of government.
Justice Souter's dissent concentrates on the principle of stare decisis, which compels the application of judicial precedent. 44 According
to Justice Souter, Fullilove controls the standard of review because the
statute at issue in Adarand is "substantially better tailored" to the
45
harm being remedied than was the statute at issue in Fullilove. Justice Souter pointed out that the majority missed a critical issue when it
failed to recognize the constitutional authority to remedy past discrimination by eliminating its present effects.4 6 Justice Souter also observed that discrimination in the construction industry may be
addressed by congressional authority, and if Congress should choose
to address the discrimination by providing preferential treatment,
such treatment would fall within the power of the Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7
The dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Breyer, underscores the issues addressed by both Justices Stevens and
Souter and highlights the common ground that exists among all of the
dissenting opinions. 4" This common ground is the acknowledgment
that racial inequality exists in America and that, as Justice Ginsburg
reiterates, Congress has the authority to actively end discrimination
and counteract any of its lingering effects.49 Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of racial inequality is only the beginning. As Jus40. Id. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41.

Id. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
Id. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2134-36 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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tice Ginsburg noted: "[blias, both conscious and unconscious,
reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination

are ever genuinely to become this country's law and practice." 5
Despite these poignant protests by the dissenters, the strict scrutiny standard of review is the law of the land as to the constitutionality
of race-conscious affirmative action programs. 51 Therefore, it is the
task of the federal government and all parties adversely affected by
Adarand to determine a course of action that allows socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses to retain a meaningful position in the defense procurement system.
A.

The Legislative History of DoD's 1207 Program

In 1986, Congress passed a law5 2 requiring DoD to set an objective that would achieve the goal of awarding at least five percent of
53
DoD's total amount obligated for contracts and subcontracts to so5
4
cially and economically disadvantaged small businesses and individuals.5
By establishing the 1207 program, Congress intended to
provide increased opportunities for minority involvement in government contracting.
In response to this Congressional mandate, DoD introduced and
implemented its own goals and procedures.5 6 In order to meet the
50. Id. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 2118.
52. Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2323(a) (1988).
53. The DoD's goal included amounts authorized and appropriated for any fiscal year for
contracts entered into with DoD for procurement, research, development, testing, and evaluation ("RDT&E" or "R&D"), military construction, and operation and maintenance ("O&M").
See 10 U.S.C. § 2323(b).
54. SDB is defined by § 8(d) of the Small Business Act as a concern that is at least 51%
owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals; and whose management and daily business operations are controlled by one or more of such individuals. 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(a)(4). The Small Business Act describes socially disadvantaged individuals as "those who
have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as
members of a group without regard to their individual qualities." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5). Economically disadvantaged individuals are defined as "those socially disadvantaged individuals
whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished
capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not
socially disadvantaged." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).
55. DoD's five percent goal also applies to historically black colleges and universities
("HBCUs"), including any nonprofit research institution that was an integral part of such a college or university before November 14, 1986, and minority institutions. Department of Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement ("DFARS") § 219.000(1) (1991) (codified at 48
C.F.R. § 219.000(1)).
56. In addition to goal setting and § 8(a) of the Small Business Act, DoD has implemented
the § 1207 program, or "rule of two" set-aside, and the ten percent bid preference. Although the
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five percent goal established by Congress, DoD has used small disadvantaged business set-asides and evaluation preferences, advance payments, outreach, and technical assistance. 57 Of all these programs,
DoD has relied heavily upon its set-aside and preference programs to
successfully attain the five percent goal. DoD's SDB set-aside provision is commonly known as the "rule of two." According to the rule
of two, a contracting officer must set-aside an acquisition exclusively
for small disadvantaged business participation when a reasonable expectation exists that there will be offers received from at least two
responsible SDBs who will offer the goods or services requested at a
price that does not exceed ten percent of the fair market price. 58 A
solicitation exclusively set aside for small disadvantaged business participation could not be withdrawn by the contracting agency unless the
set-aside was inappropriate or the low, responsive, and responsible offeror submitted a price which exceeded the fair market price plus a
ten percent ceiling.5 9
With regard to evaluation preferences, DoD provided that in
procurements conducted under full and open competition, offers from
small disadvantaged businesses were to be given an evaluation preference.6" DoD's preference provision requires contracting officers to
place a ten percent premium on all bids submitted by contractors that
did not qualify as SDBs. 1
An understanding of the purpose of the SDB contract goal legislation and DoD's regulations is needed in order to appreciate the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand on DoD's SDB
procurement program. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the
statute merely makes these tools available to DoD as a means of achieving its contract goals,
DoD's procurement regulations, prior to October 23, 1995, mandated their use. See DFARS
Part 219.5 (1991) (listing SDB contracting procedures and business concerns). "Over 60 percent
of DoD's contracting with SDBs occurs through either the "rule of two" set-aside or through the
§ 8(a) program." White House Office of Communications, supra note 8, at 61.
57. DFARS § 219.201(a) (1991).
58. DFARS § 219.502-2-70(a) (1991).
59. DFARS § 219.506(a) (1991). Several other restrictions on SDB set-asides exist. For
instance, a contracting officer may not set aside an acquisition for exclusive SDB participation if
the goods or services have been successfully acquired by small business set-aside or the acquisition is for construction with an estimated cost under $2 million, or dredging with an estimated
cost under $1 million. DFARS § 219.502-2-70(b) (1991). See DFARS Subpart 219.5 (1991) (providing a full set of rules and regulations for DoD's set-aside program).
60. DFARS § 219.7000 (1991).
61. DFARS § 219.7002 (1991). Preferences are optional when other than price related factors are evaluated. See DFARS § 219.7001 (1991). Evaluation preferences are not provided
when, among other things, small purchase procedures are used or a solicitation is issued on a
small business or SDB set-aside basis. See DFARS § 219.70 (1991) (detailing an exhaustive list
of restrictions on the use of evaluation preferences for SDBs).
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1207 program is limited. In DoD's 1985 appropriations bill, the House
Committee on Appropriations raised concerns about "the level of socially and economically disadvantaged business participation in defense procurements. '6 2 The Committee reported that only 1.9% of
DoD's procurements were awarded to SDBs. 63 The Committee
opined that this did not appropriately reflect the Department's "best
efforts toward expanding opportunities for such businesses."'
This
low level of participation created a concern which led to the DoD's
study assessing the feasibility of increasing
procurement opportunities
65
for SDBs to a level of ten percent.
Although DoD reported that it could not achieve a ten percent
goal while continuing to maintain its standards of contract responsibility, it found that only one percent of each fiscal year's procurement
expenditures from 1969 to 1973 had gone to SDBs. 66 Thus, it was apparent to the Committee that these expenditures were paltry when
compared to the total amount of DoD procurement spending and that
more could be done to assist SDBs in gaining a more equitable share
of defense contract dollars.6 7 The Committee opined that the absence
of SDBs in competitive contracting was the result of their exclusion
from "participation in the 'early' development of major Defense
systems.

68

During the debates over the 1207 program, several notable observations were made by certain members of Congress. For instance,
Representative Savage recognized:
[O1nly 2.2 percent of FY84 procurement dollars and less than 1 percent of RDT&E dollars went to SDBs under prime contracts....
This is outrageously unfair in light of general population proportions and even more egregious if you look at statistics of those who
are defending our country.... Black Americans constitute only 12
percent of our total population, but comprise 19.6 percent of our
Armed Forces. Hispanics 3.6 percent and other minorities 4 percent .... Minorities account for 26.7 percent of the Armed Forces
62. See Memorandum from Gurden E. Drake, DoD Office of the Deputy General Counsel
(Acquisition and Logistics) to the Adarand Working Group 20 (Aug. 30, 1995) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 1086, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1984)) (on file with author) [hereinafter Drake
Memorandum].
63. Id.
64. id. at 20 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1086, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1984)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 22 (citing H.R. REP. No. 332, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1985)).
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should participate at least 10 percent.., in prepara[and they]
69

..

tion for war.
In addition to Representative Savage, Representative Collins expressed anecdotal evidence of discrimination by the Department
when she stated:
What has happened heretofore is that you have had one or two minorities to come into the system; they are given some little, small
contracts by DoD; the Department then finds, for no reason whatsoever, problems with the contract, the way it has been executed,
and the way the services are being done; it takes everybody in Congress to try to straighten that matter out; and then, in spite of our
efforts, DoD takes the contract away.
Minorities do not get a fair shake when it comes down to procurement in the Federal Government. This amendment will assure that
minorities who are readily accessible and available to participate in
DoD contracting and who are qualified to70 provide needed services,
become part of the procurement system.
Despite the failure of the ten percent SDB participation amendment (the 1207 program) to make it through Conference, the program
was reintroduced in 1986.71 Representative Bustamante expressed
support for the 1207 program when he stated: "[t]he Committee included this section to encourage the Department to pursue higher
levels of minority business participation.... It promotes the opportunity of all to compete in our economy. And it reaffirms our commitment to full economic parity for all American businesses." 7 2 The end
result of the reports, debates, and hearings was the passage of the
1207 program into law.73 The program required DoD to achieve a
five percent goal in awarding total contract and subcontract dollars to
74

SDBs.

III.

ADARAND'S EFFECT ON DOD'S 1207 PROGRAM

As is evident from this sampling of legislative history, Congress
enacted the 1207 program to provide SDBs with an opportunity to
compete in the DoD procurement system, to gain experience in procurement, and to provide a mechanism to ensure an equitable distri69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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Id. at 24 (citing 131 CONG. REC.H4943 (1985)).
Id. at 25-26 (citing 131 CONG. REc. H4943 (1985)).
Id. at 26 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H5264 (1986)).
Id. (citing 132 CONG. REC. H5400 (1986)).
Id. at 27-28 (citing 132 CoNG. REc. H10,118 (1986)).
Id.
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bution of DoD contract dollars to those SDBs capable of performing
work in accordance with DoD standards. These purposes were addressed by The Honorable William T. Coleman III, General Counsel
of the Army, during his speech at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Legal Services Worldwide Conference, where he informed conference
participants that, while Adarand requires federal affirmative action
programs to be reviewed under strict scrutiny, the decision "did not
offer guidance in determining whether a government interest is compelling and the nature of the record that would be needed to justify a
program."7 5 The Army General Counsel explained that "as these issues have not yet been resolved, there is no need to change the way
[the Army does] business," especially its contracting programs. 76 The
General Counsel noted that if the Army's program was subject to consuch a case was "likely [to] have governmentstitutional challenge,
'77
wide implications.
Not surprisingly, the Army General Counsel's predictions came
true. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers received its first challenge to
its set-aside program.7 1 The challenge came from a non-SDB contractor, a California corporation, registered in Hawaii with its principal place of business in Hawaii.7 9 The corporation has filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii asserting that
an award of a construction contract to an SDB was invalid since the
basis for the award, the SDB set-aside, was unconstitutional in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand.8 °
Specifically, the plaintiff corporation alleges that although it submitted the lowest bid for the project, its bid was rejected because it
lacked certification as a SDB.81 Moreover, the plaintiff contends the
following: (1) no legislative evidence has been proffered which supports a finding that DoD's SDB set-aside program is narrowly tailored
75. U.S. ARmY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, SIXTm WORLDWIDE USACE LEGAL SERVICES CONFERENCE REPORT 31 (1995) [hereinafter USACE REPORT].

76. Id. By passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act ("FASA") in 1994, Congress and the Executive Branch expressed their support of minority business opportunities in
federal procurement. See Pub. L. No. 103-355 (1994). FASA made DoD's small disadvantaged
business award goal government-wide. All federal agencies now have a five percent goal for
award of total contract and subcontract dollars to SDBs. See Devron E. Hewitt, Adarand: Misplaced Politics in the Courts, PROCUR.EMENT LAW, Spring 1995, at 1.
77. USACE REPORT, supra note 75, at 31.

78. Gusalino Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Dept. of Defense, No. 95-00854 ACK (D. Haw. filed Oct.
17, 1995) (first amended verified complaint for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction).
79. Id. 1 1.
80. Id. 1 26.
81. Id. 11 11-12.
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to correct a known and documented history of prior racial discriminatory practices in the awarding of federally financed construction contracts in Hawaii; (2) DoD -has improperly imposed the five percent
goal on the state of Hawaii since a large portion of the Hawaiian construction trade consists of minority contractors; and (3) DoD has violated plaintiff's constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection by excluding the plaintiff from the bidding process, which is
otherwise based on full and open competition.8 2 Although the dollar
amount of the contract awarded to the SDB was relatively small, the
award had great implications to the Army, the DoD, and the federal
government due to the government-wide application of DoD's 1207
set-aside program.
In a memorandum dated October 23, 1995, the Under Secretary
of Defense informed all major commands that, effective immediately,
DoD had suspended all of its SDB set-aside regulations.83 Whereas
the Army General Counsel may have been ready to confront constitutional challenges to the Army's set-aside program after the Adarand
decision, a politically protracted analysis led DoD officials to conclude
that the 1207 program may be indefensible against the Supreme
Court's standard of strict scrutiny imposed in Adarand. 4 It is currently unknown whether DoD's suspension of its SDB set-aside and
the plaintiff corporation's challenge to that program will affect the
contract awarded to the SDB in Hawaii. While the plaintiff's challenge is most likely in response to Adarand, the challenge highlights a
legitimate concern about the current set-aside program-namely, the
imposition of set-asides in a geographical area that has large participation by minority contractors in that area's construction trade.
The immediate effects of Adarand and DoD's recent decision to
suspend its SDB set-aside regulations are difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, SDBs and contracting officers are gravely concerned that the suspension will result in a loss of prime contract and subcontract
opportunities for a segment of society which has been historically excluded from DoD's procurement system. In addition, the majority of
federal contracting officers may display concern because their performance is partially measured by their ability to promote greater
82. Id. %%15-16, 21-32.
83. Memorandum from Paul G. Kaminski to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Service Acquisition Executives (Oct. 23, 1995) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Kaminski Memorandum]; see Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Small Disadvantaged
Business Utilization Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,954 (1995).
84. Kaminski Memorandum, supra note 83.
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SDB participation in the government contracting process. Finally, the
Adarand decision attacks the presumption of discrimination inherent
in the Small Business Act's definition of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.8 5
One immediate effect of Adarand, however, has been the numerous challenges to DoD's set-aside program in the form of complaints
and protests initiated prior to DoD's suspension of its regulations.
For example, two cases challenging DoD's SDB set-aside program
have been filed with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers after the
Supreme Court's ruling in Adarand.6 First, a solicitation was issued
by the U.S. Army Engineering District, Baltimore, seeking bids for
the repair and renovation of two buildings at Ft. Belvoir.8 7 The District issued a synopsis which indicated that the acquisition was being
considered for exclusive small disadvantaged business participation,
but all bidders were encouraged to request bid information.88 Subsequently, the contracting officer concluded that more than two SDBs
would submit bids at fair market prices and as a result, the contracting
officer issued an amendment to inform bidders that the acquisition
would be set-aside. 9 In response, an agency bid protest was filed
challenging the validity of the set-aside based upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand. °
Similarly, the second bid protest filed with the U.S. Army Engineer District, Mobile, challenged the validity of a solicitation issued as
a set-aside for the construction of an aircraft parking apron in Florida
with an estimated cost of $7.5 million.9" In both of these pre-set-aside
suspension cases, the Corps' Divisions concluded that each respective
contracting officer reasonably followed the rule of two.9 2
The above decisions ultimately concluded that Adarand was not
clear judicial precedent with respect to the unconstitutionality of the
85. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102-05 (1995). Members of certain minority groups are presumed to be disadvantaged, but that presumption is rebuttable if the
disadvantage does not in fact exist. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(6)(C) (1988).
86. Memorandum from Danielle Conway-Jones to Donald Remy, Assistant General Counsel of the Army (June 26, 1995) (on file with author).
87. Elrich Contracting, Inc., U.S. Army Engineer Division, North Atlantic ("NAD")
Docket No. 95-007-P, $ 1 (Aug. 25, 1995) (unpublished pre-award agency protest).
88. Id. 2.
89. Id. 1 3.
90. Id. 1 6.
91. Greenhut Constr. Co., Inc. et al., U.S. Army Engineer Division, South Atlantic
("SAD") Docket No. 95-7-P, I 1 (Aug. 1, 1995) (unpublished agency protest).
92. Id. 15; Elrich Contracting Inc., NAD Docket No. 95-007-P, 9 17.
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DoD's SDB set-aside program.93 In light of the Comptroller General's decision in McCrossan Construction,9 4 contractors who would
otherwise seek relief from the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
upon perceiving an apparent agency violation of procurement statutes or regulations, are no longer filing bid protests with this forum.
The McCrossan decision informs contractors that the GAO will not
decide whether an agency's actions are unconstitutional because such
constitutional issues are matters for the court to decide. 95 Thus, until
a court of competent jurisdiction determines that race-based federal
affirmative action programs are unconstitutional, the GAO will not
hear such challenges.
Unfortunately, DoD has been placed in the precarious situation
of defending its set-aside programs in cases initiated prior to its decision to suspend its set-aside regulations. Furthermore, now that DoD
has suspended its regulations without providing for public comment in
accordance with federal agency notice procedures,9 6 the Department
has opened the door for administrative challenges from SDBs that
have been directly affected by the suspension.
One commentator has stated that Adarand "is almost certain to
have a chilling effect, [b]ut in the long run, the results will be 'a mixed
bag,' with some wins and some losses, depending on the particular
facts of each case and the particular viewpoint of the individual judges
who hear the cases. ' 97 DoD's response to Adarand demonstrates that
it does not intend to share in the "mixed bag" of wins and losses,
rather, by announcing the suspension of its SDB set-aside regulations,
DoD chose not to take that battle to federal court. DoD has deemed
it more prudent to provide its contracting officers with general policy
guidelines.9 8 For instance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has requested that contracting officials "make participation of SDBs in [ I
contracting and subcontracting programs a number one priority and
redouble efforts to achieve and exceed past levels of SDB
participation." 99
93. Id.
94. C.S. McCrosson Constr., Inc., B-259225, Mar. 16, 1995, 95-1 CPD 9 146.
95. Id. at 4.
96. See Kaminski Memorandum, supra note 83 (waiving the notice requirements of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act because action to take account of the Adarand decision
was "urgent and compelling").
97. Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, 81 A.B.A. J. 70 (1995).

98. See Kaminski Memorandum, supra note 83.
99. See Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of the Defense Agencies (Oct. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
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As is evidenced by DoD's suspension of its set-aside program, the
Supreme Court's decision in Adarand has significantly and unalterably affected a major vehicle used by SDBs to gain equitable access to
DoD's procurement system. Despite this blow, Congress, DoD, and
other agencies must now either look to other means of justifying present remedial affirmative action programs or must begin placing
greater emphasis on other DoD and government programs that are
not race-based. An optimal alternative is the use of race-neutral
measures which concentrate on increasing the national defense industrial base by cultivating small businesses crippled by economic
disadvantage.
IV.

USE OF DISPARITY STUDIES TO SUPPORT THE 1207
PROGRAM

Unfortunately, as demonstrated above, Congress did not anticipate the need to prepare specific studies to support the determination
that race and gender discrimination permeated the defense procurement system and the private defense industry. Given the immediate
need to seek and obtain remedies for past discrimination in defense
procurement, Congress relied upon only a few studies and anecdotal
evidence of discrimination when enacting the 1207 program.'
Therefore, had Congress envisioned the aftermath caused by
Adarand, presumably it would have taken steps to fully document the
past discrimination and the necessity of race-conscious federal affirmative action programs.
Presently, DoD, like Congress and other federal agencies, must
decide the importance of its SDB set-aside program. If DoD should
decide to resurrect its SDB set-aside regulations or some modified
version of the program, it will have to demonstrate that these programs are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest-namely, accounting for the current passive discrimination in
the defense procurement industry, in order to justify setting aside acquisitions for exclusive small disadvantaged business participation and
to pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny standard of
review.
The method suggested to satisfy the compelling government interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard is the compilation of dispar100. See Drake Memorandum, supra note 62, at 19-28.
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ity studies or factual predicate studies. 10 1 These studies attempt to
demonstrate that discrimination in a market area has resulted in the
underutilization of minority-owned firms, thereby necessitating the
use of a race-conscious affirmative action program to remedy that discrimination." 2 The methodology of a disparity study may follow the
guidelines established in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. °3 In
Croson, the Supreme Court held that an inference of discrimination in
an entity's market area may be drawn from a significant statistical disparity between the percentage of minority businesses utilized as prime
contractors, and the percentage of available and responsible minority
firms in the market area that are capable and willing to perform the
required work."° Statistical findings are often accompanied by anecdotal evidence, l0" which, in narrative form, helps to explain routine
practices of both passive and active discrimination that result in the
exclusion of minority-owned businesses from contracting
06
opportunities.1
Although the task of compiling the necessary statistics to measure
the disparity between the percentage of SDB utilization and SDB
availability in defense contracting may seem herculean, present technology provides the government and private industry with innovative
tools to assist them in the collection of this data. In addition, the
short-lived existence of DoD's rule of two regulations and policies
also provides a basis upon which to measure the utilization of SDBs in
government contracting. For instance, DoD's eight years of experience with the rule of two program should yield sufficient data regarding the effectiveness of this program in contributing to the attainment
of the statutorily prescribed five percent goal of minority participation
in government contracting. The statistics gathered over the eight-year
life of DoD's rule-of-two program can also be used to detect those
industries in a particular market area where minority firms have been
101. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
102. Disparity Study Final Report from Mason Tillman Assoc., Ltd. to Alameda County
Transportation Authority (June 1994) (on file with Alameda County Transportation Authority)
[hereinafter Disparity Study].
103. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469-504.
104. Id. at 501.
105. Anecdotal evidence includes the following: SDB's inability to obtain contracts for private sector work; existence of an "old boy's network;" SDB denied award of contract, despite
status as low, responsive, and responsible bidder; disqualification of SDB as nonresponsible, but
later determined to be responsible; and SDBs being discouraged from participating in competition. See DisparityStudy, supra note 102, at 3-4, 5-6.
106. Id. at 3.
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unable to make inroads. DoD could then determine which industries
are prone to greater levels of disparity between SDB utilization and
SDB availability. Finally, based upon the information received from
disparity studies, DoD could establish time parameters for the application of the rule-of-two program in those industries where minority
firm underutilization has been demonstrated.
A.

Alternatives to Race-Based Set-Asides

DoD has determined that in taking account of the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand, its SDB set-aside regulations are not
likely to withstand review under the strict scrutiny standard. 10 7 Therefore, it is incumbent upon DoD to determine other options that will
prevent the demise of SDB contractors in the defense industrial base.
DoD has the option of reviving its labor surplus area ("LSA") setaside program or tailoring their existing programs such that they provide special treatment to businesses located in economically distressed
areas.
The purpose of the LSA set-aside program is to increase the involvement of contractors in the federal procurement process who
have typically suffered economically in the American business environment as a result of their physical location. 10 8 Because eligibility
requirements for this program are based solely on economics, the
existence of potentially unconstitutional racial preferences is not implicated. The Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") defines a "labor surplus area" as a geographical area identified by the Department
of Labor that has "concentrated unemployment or underemployment
or an area of labor surplus."10' 9 Furthermore, the FAR defines a "labor surplus area concern" as one that "together with its first tier subcontractors will perform substantially in labor surplus areas."11 0
Performance is "substantially in labor surplus areas if the costs incurred under the contract on account of manufacturing, production, or
performance of appropriate services in labor surplus areas exceed fifty
percent of the contract price.""'
If properly reconstructed, the LSA set-aside program could realistically be instrumental in retaining SDBs in the defense industrial
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Kaminski Memorandum, supra note 83.
48 C.F.R. §§ 20.000-20.102 (1995).
48 C.F.R. § 20.101 (1995).
Id.
Id.
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base that are otherwise too large for SBA's section 8(a) program but
too small to compete effectively against small businesses in their setasides or against large businesses under full and open competition.
While the LSA set-aside program would not retain all SDBs, it could,
for the immediate future, provide an objective rather than a discretionary means of involving those businesses located in economically
distressed areas in the defense industrial base. Although there are no
concrete numbers to define the makeup of the businesses located in
labor surplus areas, DoD can be confident that through implementing
the LSA set-asides, small disadvantaged businesses will have an opportunity to receive an increased number of government contracts.
In addition, DoD has the opportunity to place greater emphasis
on its mentor-protege, advance payments, outreach, and technical
assistance programs. These programs, with the exception of the mentor-protege program, 12 are race-neutral measures that can be employed to assist SDBs in retaining a foothold in DoD's procurement
system. Likewise, Congress can enact race-neutral legislation to provide non-traditional firms with access to capital and bonding assistance. These race-neutral incentive measures can be used to attract
minorities, women, and economically disadvantaged entrepreneurs
who are otherwise qualified to participate in DoD construction and
procurement.
V.

CONCLUSION

Aside from the budget debates, the question pervading the political arena has been whether race-based affirmative action programs
have outlived their usefulness. As demonstrated above, affirmative
action programs extend further than equal opportunity in employment and equal access to education. Affirmative action programs in
federal government contracting have provided contract opportunities
to small disadvantaged businesses who otherwise would not have been
included in the federal government's industrial base. Specifically, the
112. See Defense Contracting: Implementation of the Pilot Mentor-ProtegeProgram,General
Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-94-101 (Feb. 1994). The mentor-protege program provides incentives for prime contractors to increase SDB participation in DoD subcontracting and
authorizes a number of other forms of developmental assistance to the protege by its mentor.
Id. at 1-2. Incentives can be cash, but more often, incentives take the form of credit towards
SDB subcontracting goals. Id. at 2. The primary goal of the program is to foster business development of any individual who can prove social or economic disadvantage or of individuals presumed to be disadvantaged. Id. at 1. The mentor-protege program increases the capabilities of
protege firms to participate as subcontractors and suppliers in DoD contracts, other government
contracts, and commercial contracts. Id.
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rule-of-two program has made competition and economic success a
reality for the majority of the DoD's SDB contractors. The objective
elements of the rule-of-two program provided contracting officials
with clear, strict, and unambiguous guidelines for seeking and attaining competitive SDB involvement in the defense industrial base. Unfortunately, with the suspension of the rule-of-two program, DoD and
SDB defense contractors will have to rely on myriad discretionary
procedures to sustain SDB involvement in defense contracting.
This change from objective standards to discretionary procedures
will likely result in stark variations in contract awards. To avoid the
uncertainties caused by discretionary procedures used to encourage
SDB participation, DoD must continue to study and implement new
measures to assure contract award consistency throughout the defense
procurement community. Ultimately, DoD must either decide
whether it can successfully draft a version of the rule-of-two program
which could withstand judicial review under the strict scrutiny standard, or determine that race-neutral affirmative action programs are
the only legal and defensible tools to remedy the social and economic
disadvantage that has plagued minority contractors in the past.
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